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Punitive Damages in Product
Liability Cases
MARK P. ROBINSON, JR.*
AND GERALD H.B. KANE, JR.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, failure to try to prevent injuries to employees is indefensible.
The practical and moral aspects of accident prevention are interrelated,
because accidents result both in waste of manpower and resources, and in
physical and mental anguish. 1
Imagine that the largest amusement park in the world, in plan-
ning a roller coaster ride, decided to forego all safety fail safe
equipment, as well as daily safety inspections, at a savings per
year of five million dollars because their actuaries told them that
such an expenditure was only certain to save three lives per year,
and that the park's insurance would cover these losses at a cost in
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1. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT PREVENTION MANUAL FOR INDUSTRIAL
OPERATIONS 2 (7th ed. 1974).
premiums of far less than five million. Would compensatory dam-
ages be a sufficient tool to handle this kind of conduct? Plainly
not.
The punitive remedy in the civil setting is society's only effec-
tive control over the mentality just described. It towers over the
criminal and bureaucratic sanctions as a means of curbing the
profit motive and compelling corporate planners to heed the de-
mands of public morality in making decisions which effect the
safety of consumers of their products.
The purpose of punitive damages was succinctly stated in the
landmark case of Luther v. Shaw:2
The law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love of
liberty regulated by law. It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible in-
strument of government, discourages private reprisals, restrains the
strong, influential and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak, and
encourages recourse to, and confidence in, the courts of law by those
wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in, or not suffi-
ciently punished by, the criminal law.
3
Today, the punitive remedy in civil cases is being attacked on
several fronts. Some detractors claim, that the remedy should not
lie where the defendant is a corporate manufacturer injecting
mass-produced products into the market place. Others claim the
civil punitive remedy is unconstitutional. Another group com-
plains about the potential excessiveness of the punitive damage
award in a mass consumer setting. California, long in the van-
guard of the law of consumer protection, rejects these challenges
to this important remedy and points the way for the courts of
other states.
II. DISCUSS CON
A. Punitive Damages Are Appropriate In Products Liability
Cases.
Manufacturers challenging the punitive damages sanction in
multiple plaintiff products liability situations received a favorable
decision in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,4 where an award
of punitive damages was held inappropriate on the basis that (1)
such damages would only punish innocent shareholders of the de-
fendant drug company; (2) manufacturers such as the defendant
would escape the deterrent effect of such awards through insur-
ance; and (3) multiple awards of punitive damages to multiple
2. 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18 (1914).
3. Id. at 238, 147 N.W. at 20.
4. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), where a plaintiff-consumer brought an action for
personal injuries (cataract formation) resulting from the use of a drug (MER/29)
which was developed by the defendant for lowering blood cholesterol levels.
IVol. 6: 139, 1978] Product Liability Cases
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs affected by the same defect in a widely marketed prod-
uct might excessively punish or even bankrupt the manufac-
turer.5
Such considerations were rejected, however, in the California
case of Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,6 a case involving the same
defective drug, the same defendant and, virtually, the same facts.
The Toole court expressly indicated its disagreement with
Roginsky;7 and since the California Supreme Court refused to
review Toole, Roginsky cannot be said to possess any authority in
California.
Other California cases in agreement with the Toole reasoning
include Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,8 where, although an award
of punitive damages was overturned on other grounds, the con-
tention that punitive damages should not be awarded against a
corporation was summarily rejected; G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior
Court,9 where, although allegations of malice were held insuffi-
cient to avoid demurrer, it was also held that a products liability
action may furnish the occasion for an award of exemplary dam-
ages; and Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co.,10 where, although there
was no verdict on punitive damages, a punitive damages instruc-
tion was held proper. This application was recently reaffirmed by
the California Supreme Court in Neal v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange.1
Wholly apart from contrary authority, the concerns voiced in
the Roginsky decision carry little weight when balanced against
the considerations favoring imposition of punitive damages in
products liability cases. As pointed out in an excellent law review
article,12 the need for punitive damages awards in the area of
products liability is particularly strong where a manufacturer
knowingly mass produces and mass markets a hazardous prod-
uct.1 3
5. Id. at 838-50.
6. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) rehearing denied.
7. Id. at 715 n.3, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
8. 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 427 (1974).
9. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 26, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221 (1975).
10. 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 240-41, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 (1968).
11. No. 208360 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Aug. 25, 1978).
12. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L REV.
1257, 1277, 1279-87 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen].
13. The strict liability theory of modern products liability law explicitly
addressed the loss distribution problems that arise when an injury is
caused by a defective product marketed by an "innocent" manufacturer,
The primary functions of punitive damages are punishment of
the defendant and deterrence of similar wrongdoing by that de-
fendant and others similarly situated.' 4 The manufacturer's main
reasons for marketing dangerous products are the reduction of
costs and the maximization of profits, powerful motives indeed
when the manufacturer is a large one and sells millions of units.
The manufacturer can, with some confidence, predict that of the
number of those harmed by its defective product, only a fraction
will be able to identify the defect as the cause of their injuries,
that fewer still will sue and that even fewer will have the stamina
and wherewithal to prosecute to judgment a difficult and expen-
sive lawsuit. Weighing the likely cost of resisting claims and pay-
ing an occasional compensatory damages award (as to which it is,
in any event, likely to have insured itself) against the much larger
savings that result from cutting corners on safety, an unconscion-
able manufacturer will inevitably tend to opt in favor of selling
the dangerous product. That is to say, the defendant manufac-
turer (and other like manufacturers) will not be deterred by the
occasional assessment of compensatory damages, nor will the
manufacturer or the public perceive such damages as a punish-
ment for the callous disregard of consumer safety. Thus, only by
eliminating the illicit profit derived from such conduct and by
placing such a manufacturer in a worse position than he would
have occupied had he not cheated on safety can the twin goals of
punishment and deterrence be realized.' 5
Two further purposes of punitive damages are to induce private
persons to enforce the laws by bringing malefactors to justice,
and to compensate victims whose actual losses exceed those for
which the law of compensatory damages allows recovery.16
Judges and lawyers sometimes forget that a lawsuit is a psycho-
logical ordeal to an individual whose contact with the law is infre-
quent. The unpleasantness of the litigation process, in which a
flesh and blood plaintiff who takes on a corporate defendant soon
since liability is imposed even though the manufacturer has exercised due
care. But the principles of strict liability are il-equipped to deal with
problems at the other end of the culpability scale where an injury results
when a manufacturer markets its products in intentional or reckless disre-
gard for consumer safety. Nor has the criminal law filled this void. A legal
tool is needed that will help to expose this type of gross misconduct, pun-
ish those manufacturers guilt, of such flagrant misbehavior, and deter all
manufacturers from acting with similar disregard for the public welfare.
The punitive damages remedy is such a tool.
Owen, supra note 12, at 1259-60.
14. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3924 (West 1973); Owen, supra note 12, at 1277, 1279-
87; Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 409, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 99 (1970); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908, Comment a at 554 (1939).
15. See, Owen, supra note 12, at 1279-89.
16. Id. at 1278.
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comes to wonder whether he is himself the defendant, provides a
powerful incentive to many persons with rightful claims to settle
cheaply or to drop their lawsuits altogether. Moreover, the costs
of products liability litigation are extraordinarily high, and like at-
torneys' fees, cannot usually be recovered from the defendant.17
Measured against the foregoing considerations, the concerns
expressed in Roginsky carry little weight. First of all, supposedly
"innocent" shareholders conjure up an image of powerless wid-
ows and orphans whose pitifully small nest eggs will be endan-
gered by punitive damage awards. In fact, however, the major
corporate shareholders are large institutions with diversified
holdings, not individuals.
Furthermore, it is precisely on behalf of their "innocent" share-
holders that corporate manufacturers seek to maximize profit at
the expense of public safety, and it is the shareholders who ulti-
mately enjoy the rewards of such conduct. Shareholders of errant
corporations are thus hardly more "innocent" than the absentee
slaveholder who hires an overseer to drive his slaves and to for-
ward resulting profits, but who claims "innocence" because he
has not himself wielded the whip. In addition, to the extent that
punitive damage awards deprive "innocent" shareholders of prof-
its derived from antisocial corporate activity, such awards simply
recoup an unjust enrichment which has fallen to these sharehold-
ers. 18 California law allows such recoupment in other contexts
from parties who are largely or entirely free of moral blame,19
thus no reason exists to exempt "innocent" shareholders.
Finally, penalizing shareholders is the only practical and effec-
tive means of controlling the acts of corporate directors and of-
ficers. It is hardly to be expected that institutional shareholders,
who have available to them the best legal and financial advice,
will idly endure what amounts to corporate mismanagement. As
stated in Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,20 "[n]o sufficient reason
appears why shareholders should be seen as captive innocent
hostages to the inhuman management of a corporate juggernaut."
17. Id. at 1287-99.
18. Id. at 1304.
19. See, 1 WrrKni, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW, Contracts §§ 28-33, at 45-48
(8th ed. 1973). One prominent example is the liability of an innocent agent who
sells goods which his principal has converted. See, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 128, Comment f at 531-32 (1937).
20. 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 427 (1974).
As to evading the effects of punitive damages by insurance, that
is evidently not a problem in California since in California, as in
many states, it appears to be against public policy to insure
against such awards.21
The concern that to allow punitive damages to the initial plain-
tiff will deprive later, but equally deserving, plaintiffs of their fair
share of such damages is ill placed. The primary focus in impos-
ing punitive damages is upon punishment of the defendant and
deterrence of like conduct by the defendant and others similarly
situated, not the benefit to the individual plaintiff. In addition,
there are many plaintiffs who will never recover the punitive
damages to which they might be entitled. For example, some 750
people a year burn to death nationwide in otherwise survivable
automobile wrecks. Under California law, 2 2 which is not unlike
the law elsewhere,2 3 punitive damages may not be awarded in an
action for wrongful death, and the tortfeasor thus escapes all lia-
bility for such damages to the heirs of such victims. Also, many
litigants fall by the vayside for a variety of reasons and never re-
cover either compensatory or punitive damages. 24 To let a wrong-
doer entirely off the hook because others might punish him, even
though they have not yet done so and may never do so, is to make
a mockery of the policies of punishment and deterrence. Finally,
it is not entirely true that later plaintiffs are equally "deserving"
with earlier plaintiffs. The earlier plaintiffs face much tougher
problems in garnering evidence to establish the product defects
and thus "deserve" greater reward for persevering, while later
plaintiffs enjoy, to an appreciable extent, a free ride at the ex-
pense of the earlier plaintiffs.25
B. Punitive Damages Are Constitutional.
California courts have repeatedly held that punitive damages
do not contravene any provision of the California or United States
Constitutions. California Civil Code Section 3294, which autho-
rizes such damages, has been uniformly upheld against a variety
of constitutional challenges under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
21. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 1668 (West 1973); CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972).
22. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 461, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416,
424 (1974); 4 WrrKIN, SUMMMARY OF CAuiFoRNmA LAw, Torts § 853, at 3146 (8th ed.
1973).
23. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908, Comment a at 554 (1939) points out that pu-
nitive damages are not ordinarily awarded in wrongful death actions. Accord, RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 925, Comment c at 624 (1939).
24. Owen, supra note 12, at 1293-94.
25. Id. at 1325.
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Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution,26 which prohib-
its excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in criminal
cases.
C. Punitive Damages And Excessiveness.
Routinely, punitive damage awards are challenged on the
ground of excessiveness. An analysis of the cases demonstrates
that a variety of checks and balances are utilized to prevent run-
away exemplary damage verdicts. A number of factors bear upon
the question of whether an award of punitive damages is too
large.
A primary consideration is the wealth of the defendant.2 7 If the
defendant has only modest means, a relatively small award may
suffice to punish him and deter similar misconduct in the future,
and an award which may bankrupt him will be deemed exces-
sive.28 On the other hand, "the wealthier the wrongdoing defend-
ant, the larger the award of exemplary damages need be in order
to accomplish the statutory objective."2 9
A second and related factor is the ease with which the defend-
ant may pass the cost along to others. If the defendant is a large
manufacturer with a mass market and can split the ordinary costs
of wrongdoing among thousands or even millions of consumers, it
makes sense that the award of punitive damages be increased to
the point where the necessary cost increases place the defendant
at a competitive disadvantage. Only in this manner will the onus
of the punitive damages award fall upon the corporation itself and
ultimately upon its shareholders who will then be motivated to
26. See, e.g., Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 66 n.13, 529 P.2d
608, 625, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 201 (1974); Zhadon v. Downtown L.A. Motors, 66 Cal.
App. 3d 481, 489, 136 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1976); Merlo v. Standard Life and Accident
Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d 5, 19-20, 130 Cal. Rptr. 416, 425-26 (1976); Wetherbee v.
United Ins. Co., 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 272, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (1971); Fletcher v.
Western National Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404-05, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 96 (1970);
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 716-17, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 417-
18 (1967) rehearing denied.
27. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 270, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681
(1971). Wealth may be determined by reference to the defendant's net worth, his
after tax income, or both. Little v. Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 451, 469,
136 Cal. Rptr. 653, 663 (1977); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 271,
95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681 (1971).
28. Merlo v. Standard Life and Accident Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d 5, 18, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 416, 425 (1976).
29. Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 65, 529 P.2d 608, 624, 118
Cal. Rptr. 184, 200 (1974).
punish or control their corporate officers. That is to say, only thus
will the award of punitive damages serve the functions of deter-
rence and punishment.30
A further consideration is whether or not, and to what extent,
the conduct in question had a business motive. 31 Presumably, the
more the defendant stood to profit from his misconduct, the
greater should be the award of punitive damages. Obviously, this
factor, like the first two, is related to the punitive and deterrent
functions of punitive damages: an award of punitive damages
which leaves to the defendant any of his ill-gotten gains cannot be
said either to punish or to deter sufficiently. Indeed the Owen ar-
ticle suggests that where the profit motive is implicated, punitive
damages awarded ought to consist of a multiple of the defend-
ant's expected profit so that the deterrent effect of the award will
be maximized.32
A fourth factor is the degree to which the defendant's conduct
may be considered outrageous and beyond the bounds of com-
mon decency.33 The more flagrant and immoral the conduct, the
larger the award of punitive damages that will be necessary to ex-
press society's abhorrence of it.
A fifth consideration is the defendant's amenability to reforma-
tion. If the defendant is unrepentant, refuses to acknowledge his
responsibility, and seeks to cover up the facts prior to or during
the lawsuit, that indicates an excessive concern with profits and
reputation at the expense of public safety. On the other hand, if
the defendant can show that he voluntarily discontinued his mis-
behavior, especially if this course of action occurred before the lit-
igation, the need for deterrence is lessened.34
It is sometimes said, under California law, that there must be a
"reasonable relationship" between the compensatory and puni-
tive damages awarded.35 No fixed numerical ratio is recognized
30. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, No. 208360 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Aug. 25,
1978).
31. Owen, supra note 12, at 1292.
32. Id. at 1316.
33. Id. at 1317-18.
34. Measures such as disciplining or discharging employees responsible
for the misconduct and substantially improving the relevant operating
procedures might also demonstrate a reformed attitude that would simi-
larly reduce the need for specific deterrence. Recalcitrance and cover-up
by the manufacturer, on the other hand, either prior to or during the liti-
gation, would indicate an excessive concern with profits and reputation at
the expense of the public safety. In the latter case, the deterrent and law
enforcement functions of punitive damages require that assessments be
tailored to teach the lesson soundly that knowingly or recklessly market-
ing defective products will not pay.
Id. at 1316-17 (footnotes omitted).
35. Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 164, 217 P.2d 19, 21 (1950).
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however, and ratios of punitive damages to compensatory dam-
ages as high as 2,000 to 1 have been approved on appeal in Califor-
nia.3 6 - Other decisions have allowed punitive damage awards of
$5,000,37 $1,750,38 and $3,000,39 respectively, even though no com-
pensatory damages were awarded. Thus, the ratio is infinite.
Under California law, the weighing of the foregoing factors lies
almost completely within the discretion of the jury, and while
subject to limited review on motion for new trial or on appeal, an
award of punitive damages is ordinarily not tampered with unless
it is clearly the result of passion and prejudice.4 0 Due to the
jury's broad discretion, each case is judged on appeal or motion
for new trial on the basis of its own merits and in light of the rec-
ord as a whole. The decision is not controlled by what other ju-
ries may have awarded to other plaintiffs on the basis of different
misconduct in other cases decided upon different evidence. 41
III. CONCLUSION
The punitive remedy in a civil setting is as old as the earliest
known systems of law. The "multiple damages" concept finds its
birth in The Code of Hammurabi in 2,000 B.C.42 Similar remedies
are found in the Hittite Laws (1400 B.C.) and the Hindu Code of
Manu in 200 B.C.43 A reference in the Bible indicates that the He-
brew Covenant Code of Mosaic Law in 1200 B.C. encompassed the
exemplary damages concept.44 In the common law setting, puni-
tive damages date at least to 1763.45
36. Id. at 163, 217 P.2d at 21 (ratio of punitive to actual damages was 2000 to 1);
Weisenberg v. Molina, 58 Cal. App. 3d 478, 129 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1976) (ratio of forty-
five to one); Zhadan v. Downtown L-A. Motors, 66 Cal. App. 3d 481, 498, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 141 (1976) (ratio of forty to one approved, but punitive damages award
reversed on other grounds).
37.. Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505 (1932).
38. James v. Public Finance Corporation, 47 Cal. App. 3d 995, 121 Cal. Rptr. 670
(1975).
39. Contento v. Mitchell, 28 Cal. App. 356, 104 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1972).
40. "When the award as a matter of law appears excessive, or where the recov-
ery is so grossly disproportionate as to raise a presumption that it is the result of
passion or prejudice, the duty is then imposed upon the reviewing court to act."
Cunningham v. Simpson, 1 Cal. 3d 301, 308-09, 461 P.2d 39, 43, 81 Cal. Rptr. 855, 859
(1969).
41. See Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 65 n.12, 118 Cal. Rptr.
184, 200 n.12 (1974).
42. G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 500 (1952).
43. M. BELLI, MODERN DAMAGES § 26, at 75; id. § 29, at 84 (1959).
44. Exodus 21:29, 22:1, 22:4, 22:7, 22:9.
45. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 2 Wils. K.B. 205 (C.P. 1763).
In the most recent California case on the subject of punitive
damages, the California Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur
on the punitive damages remedy as it applies to a large corpora-
tion.46 While Neal involved a claim for bad faith refusal of insur-
ance benefits, and thus dealt with a mass service, and not a mass
product, the case has strong implications for ordinary products li-
ability cases. In addition, it directly addresses several of the argu-
ments often made against awarding punitive damages in products
liability cases. For example, in answer to the argument that the
large corporation would merely pass on the cost of the punitive
verdict to the consumer, the California Supreme Court responded
that by doing so, the corporation places itself at a competitive dis-
advantage. Likewise, despite a claim of excessiveness, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's judgment of
$750,000 indicating that the preconditions for punitive damages
had been satisfied.
The very antiquity of the remedy and its appearance in such di-
verse systems of law at such different periods indicates that the
remedy speaks very directly to deeply ingrained notions of funda-
mental fairness. Nothing in the law of products liability provides
any reason for refusing to heed the strong appeal of the remedy
where the behavior of a mass manufacturer or marketer other-
wise warrants its imposition and every consideration of policy
militates in favor of imposing such sanctions where flagrant disre-
gard for the well-being of the consuming public is established.
46. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, No. 208360 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Aug. 25,
1978).
